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Abstract Unemployment insurance is usually found to show negative effects in the
transition from unemployment to a new job. However, the extent to which workers’
careers might improve or deteriorate as a result of the unemployment insurance sys-
tem is not immediately clear. This paper addresses the effects of certain aspects of
this system on employment stability by jointly accounting for benefits endogeneity,
dynamic selection issues and occurrence dependence. The analysis is undertaken for
a dual labour market, such as the market in Spain, where temporary and permanent
workers differ with respect to numerous individual and labour market characteristics.
We find that non-insured unemployed workers experience a greater rate of transition
to employment than insured workers. But we also find that benefits encourage job
stability for temporary workers not only by increasing subsequent job tenure but also
by increasing the probability of entering into a permanent contract. Finally, we get
that shortening the duration of the benefit entitlement period does not seem to lead to
significant gains in overall employment stability, which increases at most by 4.3 %.
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1 Introduction
The impact of the unemployment insurance system on labour markets is currently at
the heart of political debate (see, for example, OECD 2013). Multiple aspects of the
unemployment benefit system are at issue, including the short- and long-term effects
of the system and the appropriate balance of efficiency and equity considerations.1 In
particular, the efficiency properties of unemployment benefits, in terms of employment
stability, are theoretically ambiguous. Accordingly, they must be tested empirically.
Empirical research on the effect of benefit duration on the exit rate from unem-
ployment is extensive, both in the US and in Europe. However, empirical literature
that describes the effects of the Unemployment Insurance System (UIS, hereafter) on
unemployment and employment durations and that controls for selection effects is
rather limited due to the scarcity of large micro datasets with complete information
on labour market histories.
Themain conclusions that can be drawn from the existing literature are that changes
to benefit duration produce substantial effects on unemployment duration2 and that
those benefits tend to be exhausted before individuals return to employment. For
example, Meyer (1990) finds that the unemployment exit rate in the US doubles one
month before benefits expire. Card and Levine (2000) conclude in the same vein
that 13 extra weeks of benefits would raise the average duration of regular claims
by approximately one week. The evidence for Europe is rather similar. Roed and
Zhang (2003), Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) and Lalive (2007) all find that benefits
strongly affect the duration of unemployment. Furthermore, they also find a large
spike in the re-employment hazard at the point of UI exhaustion for job seekers. More
close to our empirical strategy, Boone and Van Ours (2009) report that the job-finding
rate for permanent jobs in the month of benefit expiration is about three times as
high for males and 3.7 times as high for females than it is in months without benefit
exhaustion. In the case of transitions to temporary contracts, they find spikes that
are approximately 50 % (males) and 75 % (females) higher than regular job-finding
rates. Some previous empirical papers have estimated the exhaustion effect of benefits
for Spain, being (Bover et al. 2002) the first to quantitatively measure the effect of
receiving unemployment benefits on the exit from unemployment. Arranz and Muro
(2004) show that, for UI recipients, the hazard rate rises dramatically −170 % two
months prior to exhaustion-, when UI benefits lapse approaches. Alba-Ramirez et
al. (2007) investigate benefit recipients’ exits from unemployment but they do not
analyse the probability of exiting unemployment near the time that benefits expire.
More recently, Rebollo-Sanz (2012) differentiates between recalls and entry into new
jobs and get that the spike in the unemployment hazard rate at benefit exhaustion
differs between recalls and new job entries.
1 Blanchard et al. (2013) recognize that some employment and unemployment protection is desirable and
emphasize that although reallocation is important for productivity growth, “much productivity growth also
comes from stable employment relationships”.
2 See Caliendo et al. (2009) and Tatsiramos and Van Ours (2012) for recent summaries of the main results
in this respect.
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Hence, there is almost no doubt that lengthier benefit periods favour longer episodes
of unemployment. However, the impact of unemployment benefits on the duration of
subsequent employment is more scarce and mixed. On the one hand, it is found that
the length of the benefit entitlement period is positively correlated with the duration of
unemployment,whichmight decrease subsequent job duration (i.e., the unemployment
‘scarring’ or ‘signalling’ effect).3 On the other hand, previously insuredworkersmight
have lengthier subsequent employment spells because benefits finance the search for
good (and therefore durable) matches. Given these competing effects, the overall
impact of benefits on employment stability is not obvious. In this sense, Tatsiramos
(2009) find that the effect of benefits on employment stability is more pronounced in
countries with relatively more generous benefit systems, such as Denmark, Germany,
France and Spain, than in countries like Greece and Italy, in which the UI system is
underdeveloped. Finally, Caliendo et al. (2012) find that the overall effect of extended
benefit duration on exit rates from subsequent employment is negative, but small, and
not significantly different than zero.
In any case, however, the literature on these issues takes a short-termperspective and
focuses on the effect of unemployment benefits on the duration of single employment
and unemployment episodes. However, a medium-term perspective is also highly
relevant, as medium- and long-term impacts of the benefit system can differ markedly
from the short-term impact if current employment duration depends on previous labour
market history. Our paper try to shed light on these issues by proposing an analysis
of the effects of benefit entitlement duration on job turnover and workers’ labour
market stability, taking into account the endogeneity of benefits, dynamic selection
and occurrence dependence issues.
This paper also contributes to the empirical literature by analysing the potential
interaction of the benefit system with a segmented labour market characterised by
two types of workers: stable and unstable. In this regard, we make our assessment for
Spain given that its extremely dual labour market responds differently to economic
shocks than labour markets in other European economies (see Bentolila et al. 2010).
In particular, we wonder whether the UIS might favour stable labour markets paths,
not only through the pure matching effect (i.e., by increasing job match quality by
allowing individuals to wait for better job offers) but also by favouring the transition
from unstable to stable jobs. The alternative to be empirically tested is whether this
system is effectively trappingworkers in a vicious cycle of unemployment and unstable
jobs.4
Our empirical analysis is based on duration models and is closely related to the
timing-of-events approach developed in Abbring and van den Berg (2004). Formally,
themodel has two states: employment andunemployment.Wemodel each state follow-
3 Evidence from Canada (Belzil 2001) and the US (Centeno 2004) suggests that jobs accepted close to
benefit termination have a higher dissolution rate, whereas higher benefit levels increase the quality of job
matches, as measured by the duration of employment. On the contrary, Card et al. (2007) and Van Ours and
Vodopivec (2008) both find that extended benefits do not affect the “match quality” of subsequent jobs as
measured by job duration.
4 In this sense, we aim to address the current literature discussing the consequences of temporary work
on individual labour careers—initiated by Booth et al. (2002), by considering the interactions between
unemployment benefits and types of job contracts.
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Fig. 1 Empirical employment hazard rates (1995–2007)
ing a competing risk approach to consider the potential endogeneity of each transition
and its relation to unemployment insurance benefit parameters. For the employment
equation, as illustrated in Fig. 1, we separately model layoffs, quits, job-to-job tran-
sitions into unstable or fixed-term contracts and job-to-job transitions into stable or
open-ended contracts. Similarly, for the unemployment equation (see Fig. 2), we sep-
arately model exits into jobs with fixed-term contracts and exits into jobs with open-
ended contracts. Additionally, our model accounts for the heterogeneous effects of the
benefit system based on contract type since we interact our benefit system covariates
with the type of contract held by the worker. Differentiating by the type of contract
offers a new dimension to the analysis that is crucial to understanding the interaction
between the benefit system and dual labour markets,5 particularly because the arrival
rate of job offers and job duration in this type of labour market vary substantially based
on previous and current contract types.
Given the design of the Spanish UIS, all employees who involuntarily become
unemployed are entitled to Unemployment Benefits, provided that they have been
employed for at least 12 months over the previous 72-month period. Individuals who
receive full-time disability benefits, people who leave their jobs voluntarily and any-
5 See Güell and Petrongolo (2007) or Rebollo-Sanz (2011) for recent empirical evidence related to the role
of temporary contracts as a stepping stone in Spain. Both papers show that the predominance of temporary
contracts accounts for the majority of employment–unemployment transitions, and that although most
workers are initially hired with fixed-term contracts, some of these workers ultimately become permanent
employees.
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Fig. 2 Empirical unemployment hazard rates for UIS receivers and non-receivers (1995–2007)
one over the age of 64 are excluded from these benefits. Benefits end when individuals
cease to be unemployed or reach themaximumentitlement period.During the analysed
period, the amount of income provided to each unemployed individual is determined
by multiplying the gross replacement rate by the individual’s average basic pay over
the twelve months preceding unemployment. This replacement rate is 70 % of previ-
ous wages for the first six months and 60% of previous wages from the seventh month
onward.6 The length of the benefit entitlement period depends on previous employ-
ment duration. Specifically, the initial benefit period is at least 4 months, which may
be extended in 2-month increments up to a maximum of 2 years, depending on the
worker’s employment record. Finally, Unemployment Assistance benefits are avail-
able for people who have not been working long enough to qualify for the previously
described unemployment benefits and for people who have exhausted them and have
family responsibilities.
In this paper, we use the information provided by a Spanish administrative database
extracted from Social Security records. The analysis will focus on labour market
transitions during 1995–2007 for a sample of male workers. We made this decision
because, in this time span,7 the arrival rate of job offers is more likely to be close
6 Today, the benefit recipient receives 50 % of previous income from the seventh month onward.
7 Employment, however, fluctuated quite substantially during this period. According to the Labour Force
Survey, the employment growth rate for workers in our sample had two minimum values (below 1.5 %), in
1996 and 2002, and two maximum values (above 4.3 %), in 1999 and 2006.
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to one (or, at least, very large for temporary job offers). Hence, in terms of exits
from unemployment, we can better interpret our results as depending primarily on
reservation and offered wages. Themajor recession of 2008–2012 was the most severe
recession in developed countries since World War II, and we think it deserves special
analysis.8
As summarized above, the previous empirical evidence on post-unemployment out-
comes suggests that, on average, there is no effect of unemployment benefits on the
quality of the post-unemployment job. However, there is some evidence of heteroge-
neous effects, which lead to zero net effects when this heterogeneity is ignored and
which indicate that some individuals might be facing liquidity constraints. Except for
Tatsiramos (2009), the existing literature bases its analysis on reforms which is a good
identification strategy but it is an alternative not possible in our case. Nevertheless,
these papers only look at post-unemployment job characteristics and do not take into
account “dynamic” effects as the ones considered in this paper. This is, from our point
of view, the main advantage of our approach, which enhance us in order to look for
the medium or long-term impact of unemployment benefits on workers’ labour market
careers. Furthermore, this paper extends the existing literature by analysing the effect
of UIS on labour market transitions when the following factors are considered sepa-
rately: quits, layoffs, and job-to-job transitions as the means of exiting employment,
and whether exits from unemployment are to temporary or permanent contracts. Thus,
it takes into account a major singularity of the Spanish labour market, i.e., strong seg-
mentation due to the existence of temporary and permanent contracts and the high
job-turnover rate.
In accordance with previous literature, particularly with the results in Boone and
Van Ours (2009), our findings show that non-insured unemployed workers experience
a greater rate of transition to employment than insured workers, except at the time
of benefit expiration. Incidentally, we find that benefits encourage job stability for
temporary workers not only by increasing subsequent job tenure—the pure matching
effect—but also by increasing the probability of entering into a permanent contract.
Finally, our simulation exercises demonstrate that reducing (or increasing) the ben-
efit entitlement period does not lead to substantial changes in employment stability
because, although unemployment duration is being affected in the predicted direction,
job turnover also increases (decreases) when unemployment benefits are cut (raised),
especially for temporary workers. In sum, job stability hardly varies both when reduc-
ing or increasing benefit entitlements, being this result quite novel in the literature.9 We
show that the reason for this is because the effects on the overall time spent employed
and on job turnover tend to cancel each other outmaking total time employed, ourmea-
sure of job stability, almost unchanged under any of the two alternative measures. On
8 There is empirical literature that points out that the effect of the unemployment insurance system might
strongly differ along the business cycle. For instance, Schmieder et al. (2012) show that the moral hazard
effect of unemployment insurance benefits is significantly lower in recessions than in booms.
9 As explained above, the papers that analyses these issues for the Spanish labour market focus on the
estimation of the direct impact of unemployment benefits on the exit for unemployment. The few studies
that deal with employment stability only deal with short-term impacts and estimate themwith no connection
to the one on unemployment exit rates.
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the contrary, when we simulate a situation where the transition to permanent contracts
is more likely, the long-term impact on job stability is much larger. This illustrates
that, in terms of enhancing job stability, it might be more important to cope with the
strong dual character of the Spanish labour market than to reshape the UI system.
Our paper starts with a brief description of the data we use and main characteristics
of the sample. Section 3 describes our empirical model, and Sects. 4 and 5 provide
our main results. The last section presents our basic conclusions.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
Weworkwith an event history data set that comes fromSpanish Social Security records
(LongitudinalWorking Lives Sample, LWLS).10 The LWLS, which is compiled annu-
ally, comprises a sample of over one million worker case histories. The initial database
includes all individuals who came into contact with the Social Security system—either
as an employee or an unemployed benefit recipient—at least once between 2005 and
2012. This database provides highly detailed information about workers’ past and
present labour activities, including contract type, receipt of UIS benefits, and reasons
for job termination. Individual characteristics, such as age and nationality, are also
present in the database.
We consider two labourmarket statuses: employed11 and unemployed. The duration
of each job spell is based on the start and end dates specified in the contract as provided
by the dataset. Likewise, we compute the duration of each unemployment episode by
measuring the time lapse between the end date of theworker’s previous contract and the
start date of the new one. The unemployment state includes registered unemployment
with or without receiving benefits, and we control whether it is due to a layoff or a quit.
For the purpose of this paper, it is interesting to emphasise that, with our database,
we can compute not only the period of unemployment during which workers are
covered by UIS (either contribution-based or assistance benefits) but also the period
after benefits expire. This contrasts with other administrative datasets, in which the
unemployment period is truncated at the point benefits expire.12
We track each spell to the point of transition or to the end of the observation
period. In the case of employment spells, each uncensored job spell is identified as
either a layoff, a quit, a job-to-job transition to a permanent contract (hereafter JJ–
PC) or a job-to-job transition to a temporary contract (hereafter JJ–TC).13 We include
transitions with an observed unemployment spell of 15 days or less within job-to-job
transitions. To avoid odd behaviour in the estimated baseline hazard functions due to
the scarcity of observations spanning longer durations,we right-censored any observed
10 For a detailed description of this sample, see Duran (2007) and García Pérez (2008).
11 We exclude from the sample self-employed workers because they are not entitled to receive unemploy-
ment benefits.
12 Indeed, Card et al. (2007) posit that the effect of potential benefits duration on the unemployment exit
rate is conditional on the way the researcher measures the end-of-benefit spike phenomenon. We offer an
illustration of this result by using our estimation sample at the end of Sect. 6.
13 Employment spells shorter than a month are not considered in the analysis.
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spells of unemployment longer than or equal to 36 months and any observed spell of
employment longer than or equal to 120 months.
The sample selection criteria are designed to minimise the impact of the initial
conditions problem on the econometric analysis. In particular, we select individuals
whose first observation in the dataset corresponds to their first employment spell. Thus,
we limit the sample to workers who are between the ages of 16 and 26 years when
they start this first job. After the first observation, we follow each worker over time.
Hence, we can compile an individual’s UIS claim history at any point in time, provided
we have all of the information regarding his labour market career. For example, we
compute UIS entitlement duration for each individual by combining the information
on his previous and current employment duration with information on his previous
unemployment duration, if any (with or without benefits), according to the rules laid
out in the Spanish UIS System. The database includes the date of the last UIS claim,
thereby enabling us to determine the number of weeks of insured unemployment that
have already accumulated at the start of a new employment spell. It is important to
stress that the administrative source and the comprehensive nature of the dataset reduce
measurement errors of these two parameters to a negligible level.
The final data used in this analysis cover the working careers of a sample of male
Spanish workers aged 18–55 years over the period 1995–2007.14 We select this period
of analysis because the favourablemacroeconomic context during these years favoured
job creation. That is, the arrival rate of job offers during this period can be assumed
to be close to one (or, at least, very large for temporary job offers),15 which enables
us to better interpret the results of the duration model presented in the paper.
Tables 1 and 2 provide a descriptive overview of themain sample characteristics and
events recorded in our dataset, with the sample split according to labour market status:
employment and unemployment. First, the data reveal a large degree of job turnover
during the sample timeframe. Although average employment duration is 21 months,
themedian contract duration is 6months, and 25%of employment spells last 2months
or less. Average unemployment duration is 6.5 months, and median unemployment
duration is 3 months. The average number of employment and unemployment spells
during the analysed period is 4.27 and 2.23, respectively. Finally, the average share of
time spent employed over the total timeframe is 71 %. Note, however, that this ratio
drops to 27 % for one out of every four workers in the sample. The large divergence
between the mean and the median shows that there are individuals in the sample with
a large degree of job mobility; that is, with below-average durations of both unem-
ployment and employment spells. The existence of this group of workers suggests the
possibility of substantial unobserved heterogeneity, perhaps correlated across spells
and states, which affects selection into employment and unemployment. Such sample
selection may induce some correlation of the unobserved heterogeneity component
14 We only consider male workers because the professional careers of female workers are more often
interrupted due to inactivity reasons, such as maternity leave and childcare, which are not always well
identified in the dataset.
15 Silva and Vázquez-Grenno (2013) study the dynamics of the Spanish Labour Market for the period
1987–2010 and determine that although the separation rate drives unemployment during recessions, the
job-finding rate acquires greater relevance in expansionary periods.
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Table 1 Main characteristics of the sample of workers (1995–2007)
Mean Median P25
Contract duration 21.19 6 2







Share of time spent employed
(1995–2007)
71 % 62 % 27 %
Sample size (workers) 193,797
Mean and median duration in months




Censored employment spells 22.93 % 49.60
Layoffs 34.90 % 7.18
Quits 10.37 % 7.58
Job-to-job to a PC 11.54 % 15.13
Job-to-job to a TC 20.26 % 8.33
Sample size (spells) 1,262,004
Unemployment spells
Censored 6.81 % 6.05
Exit to TC 91.40 % 5.92
Exit to PC 1.80 % 12.59
Sample size (spells) 311,699
TC temporary contract,
PC permanent contract
with the UIS System variables because eligibility rules make such variables dependant
on workers’ labour market histories. This issue will be addressed in the econometric
analysis.
Table 2 offers an overview of the recorded events. The data reveal that layoff is the
most common employment exit alternative for this sample of workers; indeed, 34.9 %
of employment spells end for this reason. It is alsoworth noting that mean employment
duration is the shortest for this type of employment transition (7.1months). In compar-
ison, mean employment duration is the longest for JJ–PC transitions (15.1 months).
Turning our attention to the sample of unemployed workers, we can observe that the
most common exit is to a job holding a temporary contract (91 %), whereas the exit
to a permanent contract is much less frequent (1.8 %).
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Table 3 Mean observed employment duration (months)
Entry from Current contract
TC PC












2.1 Interactions between the UIS system and labour market paths: some stylised facts
In this paper, we are primarily interested in the effects of benefit entitlement duration
on individuals’ employment stability. Because both unemployment and employment
durationmight be correlatedwith the duration of unemployment benefits, the following
subsections provide a review of the different effects that might be relevant to the
assessment of this issue.
2.1.1 The matching effect
We start by looking at whether benefit duration is positively correlatedwith subsequent
employment duration. In this paper, we consider job duration to be a measure of job
match quality.16 Table 3 presents mean employment duration for three alternative
job-entry paths: (1) job-to-job transition; (2) insured unemployment spell; and (3)
uninsured unemployment spell. The data in this table show that job-to-job transitions
tend to be the transitions with the lengthiest subsequent job spells, followed by benefit
receivers. For the latter group, job duration increases with the length of the benefit
period. Although the focus of our analysis is on the relationship between UIS and
subsequent employment stability as an indicator of a good match, we will also analyse
the influence of benefits on the type of transition experienced. In particular, our data
show that employees who receive benefits have a greater chance of entering into
a new job with a permanent contract than individuals who do not receive benefits.
For example, the share of insured workers that hold a permanent contract in their
subsequent job is 29 %; for uninsured workers, it is just 21 %.
16 Match quality is difficult to quantify empirically. In this paper, we rely on theory to identify job tenure
with match quality. The concept that a lengthy job duration represents a good match comes from Jovanovic
(1979), who finds that a match is a pure experience good; i.e., the quality of a match is not known ex ante,
but must be experienced. We consider this approximation of match quality especially relevant for highly
segmented labour markets like the one in Spain.
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Table 4 Unemployment exit probability and the length of the UIS entitlement: (%)
Unemployment duration (months)
Prev. contract TC Prev. contract PC
4 (%) 8 (%) 12 (%) 4 (%) 8 (%) 12 (%)
Exit to TC
UIS entitlement
4 42.33 20.45 18.54 46.15 12.42 15.38
8 24.95 44.77 13.92 14.69 45.83 20.83
12 18.77 20.16 41.88 15.42 10.53 59.65
Exit to PC
UIS entitlement
4 0.65 0.40 0.98 2.02 0.02 0.01
8 0.38 0.65 0.01 0.18 1.67 0.02
12 0.37 0.38 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.01
TC temporary contract, PC permanent contract
2.1.2 The exhaustion effect
Almost 50 % of our sample of unemployed workers receives unemployment bene-
fits, being this rate much larger among workers previously hired under a permanent
contract (63 %) than among temporary workers (42 %). Table 4 shows unemploy-
ment outflows in relation to benefit entitlement duration by the type of contract held
in previous and subsequent jobs. Note that this exit probability differs considerably
among the different cases considered. In this regard, some salient points should be
emphasised. First, the correlation between unemployment duration and entitlement
length is substantial and positive. That is, insured workers experience longer periods
of unemployment than other workers. Second, the importance of the timing of bene-
fit exhaustion is evident. Specifically, the probability of unemployment exit displays
large spikes at the time benefits expire. For example, a temporary contract worker
entitled to 4 months of benefits has an unemployment exit probability of 42.33 % at
month 4; this probability decreases by more than 20 percentage points once benefits
are exhausted. The same pattern is observed for the other UIS entitlement lengths and
for workers who previously held a permanent contract.
The statistical analysis presented above provides some interesting insights into
the labour market paths of workers and how they can be the related to the Spanish
UIS system.17 It seems that the duration of both employment and unemployment
are related to UIS entitlement length. This empirical evidence will be considered in
our econometric model to evaluate the relationship between the Spanish UIS and
individuals’ labour market stability.
17 In Rebollo-Sanz (2012) one can also find empirical evidence of the importance of the eligibility-
requirement effect to employment outflows.
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3 Methodology
To investigate whether the UIS affects job stability, it is crucial to account for dynamic
selection and endogeneity issues (i.e., the endogeneity of previous unemployment
duration on subsequent employment duration). For this purpose, we use durationmod-
els that are closely related to the timing-of-events approach of Abbring and van den
Berg (2004). This approach is able to solve the endogeneity problem caused by selec-
tive treatment by exploiting the variation in the timing of each transition. In particular,
we set up a multivariate mixed proportional hazard rate model (MMPH) that com-
bines information related to an individual’s use of the UIS system with information
on employment and unemployment dynamics.
Our evaluation setup requires us to address the issue of multiple selectivity. As a
basis of the analysis, we model the event history of an individual starting with his first
entry into the state of employment {Te}. The first selection relevant to our study is the
individual’s exit from the current employment spell and, in particular, how the design
of UIS might influence the type of exit (layoff, quit, JJ–TC, JJ–PC). The duration of
the employment spell {Te} will be affected by the “matching effect”; that is, lengthier
UIS durations might help to find the right “match” and thereby guarantee job stability
or, at least, it may favour lengthier employment spells, either by reducing the layoff
probability or by increasing job-to-job transitions to permanent contracts. Based on
the descriptive analysis previously presented, one could infer that this effect should
be particularly relevant for workers who start with a temporary contract and obtain a
permanent one after a spell of unemployment. Note that because the exit from employ-
ment to each competing risk is driven by observed and unobserved characteristics and
therefore by a non-random process, the composition of the subsample of job seekers
with respect to observables and non-observables is different than the subsample of
job-to-job movers.
Once the individual is unemployed {Tu}, the second selection process takes place.
The unemployed worker can re-enter employment when he receives a job offer and
accepts it. In Spain, the offer arrival rate for jobs with permanent contracts is notably
lower than the rate for jobs with temporary contracts. Accordingly, although the design
of UIS might influence the timing and the type of exit we have two competing effects
in this case. Specifically, lengthier benefit entitlement periods lead to longer unem-
ployment spells, whichmay negatively affect the arrival rate and types of job offers the
individual receives (due to the depreciation of general human capital skills, negative
signalling, etc.). However, the longer the benefit entitlement period and corresponding
lengthier unemployment spell might give the worker adequate time to search for and
find a good and durable job offer (i.e., employment with a permanent contract). Hence,
there is a selection process wherein the composition of the subsample of job seekers
(with respect to observables and non-observables) is different than the subsample of
new job entrants.
Handling the selection problems outlined above requires the control of observable
and unobservable individual differences and an allowance for the correlation between
different unemployment spells and employment processes. This is accomplished by
the simultaneous estimation of employment and unemployment spells with corre-
lated unobservable characteristics. The non-random selection process due to observed
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characteristics is controlled by the inclusion of covariates that comprise current and
past individual and job characteristics. To account for selectivity in the level of unob-
served characteristics, we specify unobserved heterogeneity specific to each transition,
thereby allowing for correlation between the different states of the individual’s history
due to his time-invariant unobserved characteristics.
By combining such a design with our precise data, the effect of interest can be
separated from selectivity issues. Assuming for reasons of tractability and interpreta-
tion that the hazard rates follow the proportionality assumption and are set in discrete
time, we have that the proportional hazard assumption18 implies that each hazard
takes the complementary log-log form (Jenkins 1995) {hsk( j/)}, where the index s
denotes the type of spell (s = e, u, that is, employment or unemployment), the index
k denotes the type of transition that is specific to each state s (4 for the employment
state and ku = 2 for the unemployment state), and the index j denotes time along
the corresponding spell. Expanding this using the parameters involved in our analysis
gives:
hsk( j/) = 1 − exp





We define six sets of explanatory variables: UIS contains the individual economic
incentives embedded in the UIS System, all of which interact with the type of contract
(C); lh consists of several variables that control for occurrence dependence issues,
including the number of previous unemployment spells and employment spells hold-
ing a permanent contract; x is based on observed individual and job control vari-
ables, including, but not limited to, age, nationality, part-time jobs, employment by a
temporary work agency, type of contract, sector of activity, firm size, job qualifica-
tion and firm ownership structure; d contains variables to control for aggregate and
regional demand side effects, including the quarterly regional unemployment rate and
the quarterly GDP growth rate; λ is the integrated baseline hazard; and, finally, υsk ,
covers unobserved individual characteristics, assumed to be specific to the origin and
destination states.19
Although, we apply a proportional hazard rate model, we emphasise that non-
parametric identification does not rely on the proportionality assumption. Additional
sources of identification include the existence of repeated employment and unemploy-
ment spells (Abbring and van den Berg 2004) and, more importantly, the abundance
of exogenous time-varying covariates20 (Eberwein et al. 2002; Brinch 2000; Gaure et
al. 2007).
18 The model is proportional in the sense that unobserved and most observed characteristics are assumed
to affect individual hazard rates multiplicatively.
19 That is, all five hazard rates are tied together through the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
The estimated correlation between unemployment duration and subsequent employment duration through
the UIS system could be spurious if individual unobserved heterogeneity affecting unemployment duration
is correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity affecting job duration.
20 As suggested by Eberwein et al. (2002), time-varying variables naturally provide an exclusion restriction
in the sense that past values of these variables affect current outcomes only through the already realized
selection process. Hence, they facilitate the disentanglement of causal treatment and duration effects from
the impact of unobserved sorting.
123
14 SERIEs (2015) 6:1–41
3.1 Parameterisation of the UIS effects
3.1.1 The unemployment hazard
For the unemployment equation, the effect of the UIS entitlement period by type of
contract is modelled as follows:
UISu = Dur B∗ρu1 + Ex B∗ρu2 + (DurB∗DurU )∗ρu3
where, DurB represents the number of insured months left before benefit exhaustion,
and ExB is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when the worker exits from
unemployment at the time benefits expire, and takes a value of zero otherwise. These
variables capture the non-stationary effects inherent in the UIS system. One could
claim that a worker’s job search effort and/or job acceptance probability increases as
the month of benefit exhaustion draws closer. From a firm’s perspective, assuming as
given this behaviour by the worker, the probability of hiring the worker also increases
as the month of benefit exhaustion approaches, with this effect being tougher for
workers with a strong attachment to the labour market. The third (DurB*DurU) term
of the above expression is an interaction of the unemployment duration with the first
variable to allow for the heterogeneous effects of the benefit entitlement across the
length of the unemployment spell.
We are able to correctly identify the exhaustion effectwith this specification because
the sample includes: (1) unemployed workers both with and without UIS; (2) it also
includes workers with the same observed unemployment duration but different entitle-
ment durations; (3) but more importantly, we can follow the unemployed workers after
their unemployment benefits have expired.21 The limited duration of benefits implies
that individuals with different entitlement durations should have different optimal
paths of reservation wages and search efforts over time. This non-stationarity is the
way to identify the effects of UIS entitlement duration on unemployment duration.
Because all UIS parameters interact with the type of contract held by the worker in
the previous job, we can evaluate some new ideas based on this model specification.
In particular, because benefits offer financial support to keep searching for better job
offers, wewonderwhether insuredworkers experience a greater probability of entering
into a new job holding a permanent contract as opposed to a temporary contract.
3.1.2 The employment hazard
In the employment equation, we model the economic incentives embedded in the UIS
system as follows:
UISe = U (DurU ∗ ρe1 + Dur B ∗ ρe2)
21 Card et al. (2007) review the literature on the “spike” in unemployment exit rates around benefit exhaus-
tion and show that spikes are typically much smaller when spell length is defined by the time to next job
than when it is defined by the time spent on the unemployment system.
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The term U is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for workers who had an
unemployment spell before the current job and takes a value of zero otherwise.22 The
covariate DurU represents the duration of the previous unemployment spell, and DurB
represents the UIS entitlement length. Hence, this expression shows that the distribu-
tion of job duration depends on previous unemployment duration, and this dependence
is specified such that the respective effects of benefit entitlement duration and unem-
ployment duration can be distinguished. The idea is to identify any heterogeneous
effects of benefits on employment stability for alternative unemployment experiences.
In particular, the identification of the matching effect is based on the concept that
differences in optimal job search behaviour of unemployed individuals with different
entitlement lengths should lead to different realised distributions of subsequent job
quality. That is, individuals with a given length of unemployment and the same level
of benefits, but a longer period of benefit entitlement, may keep searching and wait
for job offers that are better in terms of employment stability.
Like the unemployment equation, all parameters in the employment equation inter-
act with the type of contract held by the employee. Hence, we can measure whether
the matching effect differs by contract type and whether benefits (indirectly) favour
job stability by increasing the workers’ chances of entering into jobs with permanent
contracts.
3.2 The likelihood function
To estimate this discrete-time duration model, we construct a panel dataset such that
the spell length of any given individual determines a vector of binary responses. We
define δsjks as a binary indicator variable denoting a transition to potential destinations
through an exit to one of the competing alternatives k, i.e., τ jks = 1 if individual i
transits from s to one of the competing ks alternatives and is zero otherwise. Let Li
be the complete set of outcome indicators available for individual i (multiple-spells).
The contribution to the likelihood function formed by the event pattern of a particular
individual, conditional on the vector of unobserved variables νi = (ν1, ν2, ν3, ν4, ν5),
can then be formulated as:

















We introduce unobserved heterogeneity non-parametrically by means of the non-
parametric maximum likelihood estimator (NMPLE). In practice, this implies that
the vectors of unobserved attributes specific to each type of transition are jointly
discretely distributed. The number of mass points is determined by adding location
vectors until it is no longer possible to increase the likelihood function (Heckman
and Singer 1984; Gaure et al. 2007). Assuming that unobserved covariates are jointly
discretely distributed with Q number of support points, the data likelihood function
22 In addition, there is a dummy variable in the empirical model that takes a value of one if the previous
unemployment spell was due to a quit instead of a layoff.
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ql = 1 (3)
where {νl, ql}, l = 1…L, are the location vectors and probabilities characterising the
heterogeneity distribution. The mass points (or combinations of mass points) and their
associated probabilities are estimated with other model parameters. Each hazard rate
contains a constant term. Accordingly, for identification purposes, the unobserved
heterogeneity is modelled by normalising the first 5-tuple of location parameters to
zero so that the estimated coefficient for the remaining unobserved types of individ-
uals denotes the deviation from the constant term. For the estimation procedure, the
probabilities ql are specified as logistic probabilities.
4 Results
The estimated model contains a large number of parameters, most of which are
included solely for control purposes and are secondary to the topics discussed in
this paper. Hence, although the full results are reported in Table 16 in Appendix, they
are not all discussed in the text. The focus in this section is on key results regarding
the impact of the UIS on employment and unemployment duration.
Overall, our MMPH model demonstrates its relevance with the significant differ-
ences between the patterns of duration dependence and the effects of the explanatory
variables on each hazard rate. The likelihood function obtains its maxima at three
mass-points in the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. These support points are
robustly identified on the basis of a large number of estimators with different starting
values. The results are also highly robust as long as the number of support points
remains between two and three.23 This may imply that the information content in the
data relating to the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity term is sufficient to
ensure robust identification of the structural duration dependence in the hazard rates,
as well as the effects of benefits on spell duration.
The MMHP model is estimated using a polynomial baseline for each hazard,24
and we also use some dummy variables to control for spikes observed at certain spell
durations—see Figs. 1 and 2. Basically, months 3, 6, 9, 12, 24 and 36 for employment
spells and months 6 and 10 for unemployment spells. For the sake of brevity, we do
not display the predicted hazards in this section because we will present them with
the results of our simulations in the robustness checks of the model (see Appendix A).
The estimated layoff, quit and JJ–TC hazard rates show negative duration dependence.
The estimated JJ–PC hazard rate shows positive duration dependence during the first
23 We also tried to estimate the model with four points of support, but there was no convergence in any of
the estimations.
24 Alternatively, we estimated the model with a piece-wise constant specification of the baseline hazard to
allow for greater flexibility. However, many of the duration variables were not identified for certain months
because there were not enough exits observed for one of the competing exits.
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TC Type I 7.37 1.41 2.90 3.86 9.76 0.21
Type II 7.97 1.53 3.15 4.18 4.16 0.00
Type III 18.37 3.71 7.37 9.99 19.25 0.11
PC Type I 0.25 0.27 0.60 0.46 6.52 0.21
Type II 0.27 0.29 0.65 0.50 2.27 0.00
Type III 0.67 0.72 1.58 1.23 13.10 0.11
These exit probabilities are computed at sample means
TC temporary contract, PC permanent contract, JJ PC job-to-job transition to a PC, JJ TC job-to-job
transition to a TC
2 years of the contract. With the exception of the quit hazard rate, all hazard rates
show spikes at specific contract durations, with the largest occurring at months 6 and
12. The estimated unemployment hazard rates also show a clear negative duration
dependence.
4.1 Unobserved heterogeneity and selection effects
Unobserved heterogeneity is responsible for a substantial degree of variation in all
estimated hazard rates (see Appendix A). Moreover, the MMPH model that we use
conceals some interesting results which would remain unknown if the model is esti-
mated separately for each labourmarket state. In Table 5, we display average estimated
exit probabilities for each unobserved heterogeneity component (e.g., worker type).
The information presented in this table demonstrates that 32 % of the individuals in
our sample are high turnover workers (mainly Type III workers in our analysis), i.e.,
they face higher employment and unemployment exit probabilities than other individ-
uals. Note that these workers face employment and unemployment exit probabilities
that are at least double the probabilities observed for the other workers. For instance,
for the employment equation, the transitions probabilities for this worker type are:
18.37, 3.71, 7.37 and 9.99 %, for the layoff, quit, JJ–PC and JJ–TC transition proba-
bilities, respectively. For the unemployment equation, the transition probabilities are:
19.25 and 0.11 % for the entrance into a temporary contract and into a permanent
contract, respectively. The differences between the other two types of workers are
smaller, although Type I individuals seem to be more stable because their employ-
ment exit probabilities are lower and their unemployment exit probabilities are higher
than those of Type II workers.
4.2 UIS system incidence on employment duration
The empirical analysis presented in this section is based on the notion that the UIS
might affect employment duration. Nevertheless, from a theoretical perspective, the
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Table 6 Parameters estimates for the UIS covariates (employment state)
Competing risks Layoff Quit JJ–PC JJ–TC
Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat
Current contract: temporary
DurU 0.1201 29.52 0.1370 16.42 −0.0841 −8.66 −0.0640 −9.75
DurB −0.0938 −18.75 −0.2267 −16.65 0.0535 17.22 −0.0182 1.45
Current contract: permanent
DurU −0.0115 −0.91 0.1719 12.61 0.0185 1.28 0.0929 6.00
DurB 0.0220 1.37 −0.1726 −7.54 −0.0011 −0.95 −0.0483 2.37
TC temporary contract, PC permanent contract, JJ PC job-to-job transition to a PC, JJ TC job-to-job
transition to a TC, DurU previous unemployment duration in logs, DurB previous benefit entitlement
length (matching effect) in logs
sign of the predicted effect is ambiguous. First, employment duration might be nega-
tively related to previous benefit length because benefits allow lengthier unemployment
spells, which might have negative consequences for subsequent employment duration
due to human capital depreciation or negative signalling effects (see Rebollo-Sanz
2011 for recent evidence for Spain). Second, employment duration might be pos-
itively related to benefits because of the “matching effect”. That is, benefits allow
the worker to devote more time to find a good, and therefore durable, match. We
add a new dimension to this analysis and wonder whether these effects could vary
between temporary workers and permanent workers. In particular, we assess whether
unemployment benefits might favour job stability by encouraging the transition from
temporary to permanent contracts.
Before analysing our results showing the impact of benefits on employment dura-
tion, it is appropriate to clarify how unemployment duration influences on subse-
quent job duration. Coefficient estimates (Table 6) lead us to conclude that unemploy-
ment duration negatively affects subsequent employment stability because outflows
to unemployment increase with previous unemployment duration (either as layoffs
or quits), whereas job-to-job transitions decrease, with the exception of transitions
from permanent to temporary contracts, which seem to increase with unemployment
duration. These results basically show that the quality of the match decreases as the
duration of the previous unemployment spell increases, regardless of whether the
worker is receiving benefits or not. However, the relevant question is not about the
effect of past unemployment duration but about whether entitlement to and collection
of unemployment benefits in the past may help workers access better jobs.
We now focus on the effects of receiving benefits. The results show that for workers
holding a temporary contract, benefits reduce the layoff as well as the quit probability.
For workers holding a permanent contract we again obtain that benefit reduce the
probability of quitting but they do not reduce the probability of being layoff. Hence,
from the side of the worker, benefits clearly help to find a better match. Coefficient
estimates also show that unemployment benefits favor workers holding a temporary
contract indirectly. That is, the probability of having a job-to-job transition increases
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Fig. 3 Measuring the incidence of the unemployment spell on employment
with the length of the entitlement. Thus, we find evidence that unemployment ben-
efits favor job stability not only by reducing the outflows to unemployment but also
increasing the inflows into a permanent contract. This last result is not found for work-
ers holding a permanent contract and coefficient estimates are not always statistically
significant for workers holding permanent contracts.
To illustrate these results, we display in Fig. 3 the employment exit probability
(computed at sample means) in relation to previous unemployment duration for dif-
ferent benefit entitlements. Note the increasing pattern of employment exit probability
from a temporary contract as the period of unemployment lengthens. This figure also
indicates that insured workers tend to have more stable labour market careers. Notice
that the differences are large. For instance, for workers with an unemployment spell
of 1 month, the monthly employment exit probability is around 11.5 % if she does
not receive benefits and it drops to 9.5 % when she is entitled to receive 24 months of
benefits. Hence, although we know that lengthier unemployment spells lead to larger
outflows from employment the importance of the effect seems to differ with respect to
insured and non-insured workers. Now let’s compute the employment exit probability
at each competing risk to better understand the results.
In Table 7, we display the estimated employment transition probability to each com-
peting risk in relation to previous unemployment duration for insured and non-insured
workers. Let’s look at the results for workers holding a temporary contract. The results
show that insured workers tend to havemore stable labour market careers because they
face lower exits to unemployment (either as layoffs or as quits) and slightly larger tran-
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Table 7 Estimated employment exit probability in relation to previous unemployment duration


















3 6.49 5.52 1.68 1.13 1.74 1.87 4.15 4.02
6 7.03 5.98 1.85 1.24 1.64 1.76 3.98 3.85
12 7.97 6.48 2.03 1.36 1.55 1.66 3.81 3.69
24 8.24 7.02 2.23 1.49 1.46 1.61 3.64 3.53
Current contract: PC
3 0.44 0.45 0.33 0.24 0.57 0.57 0.47 0.43
6 0.43 0.45 0.37 0.28 0.58 0.58 0.50 0.46
12 0.43 0.45 0.42 0.30 0.59 0.59 0.53 0.49
24 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.34 0.60 0.60 0.57 0.52
This exit probability is computed at the mean sample characteristics for temporary and permanent contracts,
respectively. We fix the spell duration at 10 months
sition probabilities to new jobs with permanent contracts. For example, the estimated
layoff probability is 5.52%when previous unemployment episode lasted threemonths
and unemployment benefits were available; if the previous unemployment duration
remains the same but unemployment benefits were not available, the estimated layoff
probability is 6.49 %. These rates move up to 6.48 and 7.97 %, respectively, when pre-
vious unemployment duration increases up to 12months. Furthermore, the probability
of quitting decreases when unemployment benefits were received. Job-to-job flows are
also affected, but to a lesser extent than outflows to unemployment. Interestingly, JJ–
PC flows increase for benefit receivers, whereas flows to temporary contracts decrease.
Hence, we obtain clear evidence that the availability of unemployment benefits seems
to increase job stability, at least for temporary workers. That is, previously insured
workers benefit from a larger probability of remaining in the same job or entering into
a more stable job than non-insured ones.
The results obtained for employees holding permanent contracts aremuch smaller in
absolute value, for both unemployment duration and the effect of UIS on employment
stability,whichmay demonstrate that once aworker has obtained a permanent contract,
previous unemployment duration becomesmuch less relevant to employment stability.
Next, we focus on the coefficient estimates for benefit entitlement duration. Table 6
shows that these coefficient estimates are statistically significant and have the expected
sign for temporary contracts. In particular, these coefficient estimates show that length-
ier benefit periods seem to favour employment stability, because outflows to unem-
ployment decrease and job-to-job transition flows increase. These results are consistent
with the models of Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and Acemoglu and Shimer (2000)
and with the results presented in Belzil (2001), Centeno (2004) and Tatsiramos (2009).
In contrast, coefficient estimates are not always statistically significant for the sample
of permanent contracts.
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Table 8 Estimated employment exit probability in relation to UIS entitlement
Layoff (%) Quit (%) JJ–PC (%) JJ–TC (%) Empl. duration
Contract type: TC
Non-insured 7.03 1.85 1.64 3.98 5.96
UIS entitlement
4 6.20 1.36 1.73 3.88 6.59
6 5.98 1.24 1.76 3.85 6.77
8 5.83 1.16 1.78 3.83 6.90
12 5.62 1.06 1.81 3.81 7.08
24 5.27 0.91 1.86 3.76 7.39
Contract Type: PC
Non-insured 0.44 0.36 0.62 0.37 42.52
UIS entitlement
4 0.45 0.29 0.58 0.47 43.25
6 0.46 0.28 0.58 0.46 43.44
8 0.46 0.25 0.58 0.45 43.57
12 0.46 0.24 0.58 0.44 43.73
24 0.47 0.21 0.58 0.43 44.00
This exit probability is computed at sample mean characteristics and for an unemployment episode of 6
months. Exit probabilities computed at employment duration equals to 10 months
In Table 8, we display the estimated employment exit probability in relation to
benefit entitlement duration for each competing risk. It could be that benefit recipi-
ents have better chances than non-recipients of obtaining permanent job offers once
employed. That is, benefit recipients accepted a temporary job offer expecting a “pro-
motion” into a permanent contract in the near future. Note that our sample includes
transitions from a temporary to a permanent contract within the same or different firm
and as Rebollo-Sanz (2011) has shown, they are more frequent within the same firm
in Spain. In particular, during 2000–2007, 83 % of the transitions from temporary to
permanent contracts took place at the same firm.
We focus on the results for temporaryworkers because they represent themajority of
employment outflows and because the matching effect could be of great importance—
in terms of job stability—to a worker that ends a temporary contract and enters into a
permanent contract. As observed in this table, the relationship between the matching
effect and entitlement duration is positive but it does not seem to be very strong. We
obtain decreases in the layoff probability from7.03%for previously uninsuredworkers
to 6.20 % for insured workers whose entitlement was four months and to 5.27 % for
insured workers whose entitlement was twenty for months—drop of 15% in the layoff
probability. The incidence on the job flows is much lower. The probability of a JJ–PC
transition increases slightly from 1.64 % for previously uninsured workers to 1.73 %
for insured workers whose entitlement was four months and to 1.86 % for insured
workers whose entitlement was twenty for months—an increase in the job-to-job
transition probability of 7 %. The probability of a JJ–TC transition decreases slightly
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from 3.98 % for previously uninsured workers to 3.88 % for insured workers whose
entitlement was four months and to 3.76 % for insured workers whose entitlement
was twenty for months.25 In terms of expected duration, our results show that average
employment duration for an uninsured worker is 5.96 months, for an insured worker
with four months of benefits is 6.59 months and for entitlements of twenty for months
is 7.39 months. Hence, the above results seem to demonstrate that insured workers
benefit from longer employment duration relative to uninsured workers, although the
magnitude of the effect is not large. In other words, the elasticity of employment
duration to benefit entitlement length is low in Spain.
Hence, our results show that benefits might improve employment stability for tem-
porary workers and that this increase comes from a pure matching effect—i.e., insured
workers have longer job tenure than uninsured workers—and from a greater chance of
entering into a new job with a permanent contract. We find that employment duration
for benefit recipients can be between 10 and 20 % longer than for non-recipients when
workers enter into temporary contracts. Hence, jobs that are found when receiving
benefits last longer than jobs found by non-recipients. These differences are lower for
workers who obtain a permanent contract in the new job. However, the duration of
benefit entitlement by itself does not seem to be highly relevant in terms of subsequent
job duration.
4.3 UIS system effects on unemployment duration
In general terms, all UIS variables in the unemployment equation are statistically
significant (see Table 9), which suggests that benefits affect the timing of outflows
to employment and that this effect varies with unemployment duration. The usual
findings, that unemployment duration increases with the length of the UIS entitlement
period and that the unemployment hazard rate rises as benefit expiration approaches
(Meyer 1990; Belzil 2001; Roed and Zhang 2003; Tatsiramos 2009; Boone et al. 2009;
Rebollo-Sanz 2012) are also obtained in this estimation.26
To illustrate the results obtained we compute the unemployment exit probability
using coefficient estimates. Figure 4 shows the estimated unemployment exit probabil-
ity in relation to unemployment duration for three alternative situations: (1) uninsured
workers; (2) insured workers with 6 months of entitlement (UIS = 6); and (3) insured
workers with 8 months of entitlement (UIS = 8). In Table 10, we display the same
estimated unemployment exit probability but for each competing risk.
25 We estimated the same model but including a dummy variable that takes a value of one when the
worker exited the previous spell of unemployment before benefits were exhausted and takes a value of zero
otherwise.We do not find a statistically significant effect on subsequent employment duration. Alternatively,
we also estimated this model but including a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the worker exited
the unemployment at the time that benefits were exhausted and takes a value of zero otherwise. In this
second case we found a significant positive effect of benefits on subsequent employment duration. This
is in line with the results presented in Centeno (2004) who shows that there is some heterogeneity in the
matching effect.
26 In Rebollo-Sanz (2012), one can find a deeper analysis of the exhaustion effects in the Spanish Labour
Market by differentiating between the effect of benefits on unemployment exits to jobs at the same firm
(recalls) and exits to jobs at a new firm.
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Table 9 Estimation results for the unemployment state
Competing risks Exit to a TC Exit to a PC
Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat
UIS variables
Previous contract: TC
DurB −0.4329 −55.3 −0.4786 −10.2
DurB*DurU 0.0605 13.4 0.1078 2.9
ExB 0.0913 6.8 0.0804 1.8
Previous contract: PC
DurB −0.5787 −42.5 −0.9269 −12.1
DurB*DurU 0.1003 6.7 0.0835 1.7
ExB 0.1979 15.7 −0.3530 −2.4
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Fig. 4 Estimated unemployment exit probability in relation to the UIS entitlement length
Our results show that the behavioural effects of benefits on unemployment duration
are substantial. Firstly, the results clearly shows the so-called “disincentive effect” of
benefits, meaning that the unemployment exit probability is much lower for insured
workers than for uninsured ones. Similarly, we obtain that the unemployment exit
probability decreases with benefit entitlement duration. For example, for a temporary
worker in the first month of an unemployment spell, the rate of exit to a temporary
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Table 10 The estimated unemployment exit probability in relation to unemployment duration and UIS
entitlement length
Unemployment duration: Exit To TC Exit To PC
1 (%) 4 (%) 8 (%) 12 (%) 1 (%) 4 (%) 8 (%) 12 (%)
Previous contract:TC
Non-insured 33.32 22.39 17.69 16.13 1.32 0.67 0.68 0.76
Insured: entitlement
4 22.48 24.20 17.69 16.13 0.78 0.73 0.68 0.76
8 16.26 15.61 19.18 13.34 0.52 0.42 0.73 0.76
12 13.60 12.95 13.34 17.50 0.42 0.33 0.47 0.82
Previous contract: PC
Non-insured 39.81 25.57 19.38 17.15 2.68 1.99 1.84 1.80
Insured: entitlement
4 23.93 30.13 19.38 17.15 0.99 1.39 1.84 1.80
8 15.36 14.08 23.03 17.15 0.46 0.66 1.21 1.80
12 12.22 10.29 11.08 20.45 0.30 0.38 0.66 1.26
contract is approximately 10, 16 and 19 percentage points lower for insured workers
(compared to uninsured workers) with entitlement durations of 6, 8 and 12 months,
respectively. The transition probability to a temporary contract decreases even more
for workers who previously held a permanent contract, by approximately 16, 24 and 27
percentage points, respectively. However, these differences in exit probability between
temporary and permanent contracts point that these results can also be interpreted in
terms of liquidity constraints—more important for temporary workers—instead of
exclusively in terms of “disincentive effects” (Chetty 2008). Thus, it could be that
workers without benefits need to accept the first job offered, whereas insured workers
can keep searching for a suitable or good match27.
Secondly, for insured workers, the unemployment exit probability slowly decreases
until the time benefit exhaustion approaches and sharply increases near the time ben-
efits are exhausted. That is, either the insured worker exits at the beginning of the
unemployment spell, or he waits until benefits are exhausted—the latter option being
more common. The exhaustion effect reflects the joint effect of falling reservation
wages and rising job search intensity at the time of exhaustion. Note that at the time
of exhaustion, the unemployment exit rate increases even higher than the rate for
uninsured workers.
Focusing on the exhaustion effect, note that for the cases represented in Fig. 4, the
unemployment exit probability increases by approximately 8–11 percentage points at
the time the benefits are exhausted relative to one month before exhaustion. Interest-
ingly, this exhaustion effect is larger for workers who previously held a permanent
contract. Again we argue that this could be an evidence of the importance of the liquid-
27 Chetty (2008) shows that 60 % of the increase in unemployment durations caused by UI benefits is due
to a “liquidity effect” rather than distortions on marginal incentives to search (“moral hazard”).
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ity constraints on explaining unemployment duration. Workers who hold a permanent
contract would probably face lower liquidity constraints than temporary ones since
they benefited from severance payments when entering into unemployment. However,
in many cases temporary workers do not receive severance payments and, when they
receive severance payments, these are notably lower than the severance payments of
permanent contracts.
Table 10 also shows the importance of the “exhaustion effect” for each competing
risk, which seems to be strongly related to exits to temporary contracts.28 Again, we
obtain that the difference in the exit probability between insured and uninsuredworkers
is larger for workers who previously held permanent contracts than for workers who
previously held temporary contracts. Thus, our results indicate that unemployment
benefits might favour job stability by allowing temporary workers to keep searching
for a good match. However, when benefits expire, the worker accepts the first job
offered, mostly due to liquidity constraints.
Some previous empirical papers have estimated the exhaustion effect of benefits
for Spain. For instance, Rebollo-Sanz (2012) differentiates between recalls and entry
into new jobs and get that the unemployment hazard rate shows a strong spike for
entry into new jobs whereas for recalls the spike is much lower.29 In Arranz and Muro
(2004)30 the exhaustion effect is notably higher to the one presented in this paper.
However, as Card et al. (2007) has shown, the way unemployment spells are measured
has a large effect on the magnitude of the spike at exhaustion. Particularly, spikes are
typically much smaller when spell length is defined by the time to next job than when
it is defined by the time spent on the unemployment benefit system. For instance, they
find that in Austria, the exit rate from registered unemployment rises by over 200 %
at the expiration of benefits while the re-employment hazard rate rises by only 20 %.
The difference between these two measures arises because many individuals leave the
unemployment register after their benefits expire without returning to work.
In our exercise, our duration measure is time to find a job.31 To illustrate the impor-
tance of this type of data when analysing the impact of unemployment benefits on
the exit from unemployment, we have also estimated our model using data only for
benefit recipients and truncating our duration measure at the time the worker exhausts
her benefits—either assistance or contribution ones. As can be seen in Table 11, we
get that the exhaustion effect is notably stronger in this new estimation than in the
28 Note that in the statistical section we show that almost all unemployment episodes end in temporary
contracts.
29 She obtains that, for male temporary workers, the recall hazard rate increases by 6.66 percentage points,
while the new job hazard rate increases by 11.39 percentage points.
30 Arranz and Muro (2004) estimate the exhaustion effect for Spain using the HSIPRE (Histórico del
Sistema de Prestaciones por Desempleo) administrative database. They obtain that the hazard rate rises
dramatically when UI benefit lapses approaches. Note, however that, as stated by the authors, one disadvan-
tage of their database is the lack of information about the labour force status the days after unemployment
benefits are exhausted.
31 Existing studies of labor market transitions near the point of unemployment benefit exhaustion have
used three alternative measures of duration: the length of benefit receipt, the duration of the registered
unemployment, and the duration of non-employment (time to next job). The last one is the one used in our
paper.
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Table 11 Measurement error when identifying the exhaustion effect
Competing risks Exit to a TC Exit to a PC
Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat
UIS variables
Previous contract: TC
ExB (full sample) 0.0913 6.8 0.0804 1.8
ExB (subsample: benefit recipients) 0.5977 23.74 0.9808 5.1
Previous contract: PC
ExB (full sample) 0.1979 15.7 −0.3530 −2.4
ExB (subsample: benefit recipients) 1.2923 21.47 1.3606 4.9
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Fig. 5 Estimated unemployment exit probability in relation to the UIS entitlement length (subsample of
benefit recipients)
former one.32 For instance, the coefficient of the exhaustion effect changes from 0.09
to 0.59 for temporary workers who exit to a temporary contract and from 0.08 to 0.98
for the exit to a permanent contract. This implies that the unemployment exit proba-
bility increases by around 75 % for temporary contracts and by 200 % for permanent
contracts at the time of exhaustion relative to one month before exhaustion. Figure 5
32 For sake of concreteness we omit the complete set of coefficient estimates. They can be provided upon
request.
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Table 12 Parameters estimates for occurrence dependence terms
Number of PC Number of job interruptions
Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat
Employment state
Layoff −0.0282 −7.01 0.0807 88.61
Quit −0.0228 −2.90 0.0870 43.66
JJ–PC 0.1291 17.19 −0.0904 −32.8
JJ–TC −0.0864 −14.2 0.0044 3.51
Unemployment state
TC −0.0187 −4.57 0.0064 6.92
PC 0.2368 11.92 −0.0848 −11.76
displays the estimated unemployment exit probability in relation to unemployment
duration for three alternative situations: (1) uninsured workers; (2) insured workers
with 6 months of entitlement (UIS = 6); and (3) insured workers with 8 months of
entitlement (UIS = 8). The comparison of this Fig. 5 with Fig. 4 clearly illustrates
the importance of the bias committed when using data only on benefit recipients.
Hence, we confirm here that, at least for the Spanish case, the exhaustion effect is
overestimated when benefit receipt is used as a duration measure.
4.4 Labour market history variables: occurrence dependence
The coefficients of the covariates used to control for occurrence dependence—the
number of previous permanent contracts and the number of unemployment spells—
are displayed in Table 12 for both employment and unemployment states. These coef-
ficients are all statistically significant and display the expected signs. They show that
workers who have previous labour market histories characterised by job spells with
permanent contracts and low numbers of job interruptions tend to have better subse-
quent employment prospects than their counterparts. Their outflows from employment
are lower and they have higher probabilities of making job-to-job transitions into new
permanent contracts.
The corresponding estimated employment exit probabilities and unemployment exit
probabilities for different accumulated, open-ended contracts and job interruptions
are displayed in Tables 13 and 14, respectively. In particular, Table 13 shows that the
number of previous open-ended contracts favours job stability because it negatively
influences the exits to unemployment (layoffs and quits) and JJ–TC transitions and
positively influences the probability of entering into a job associated with a permanent
contract. In terms of unemployment outflow, we see that the probability of exit into a
new permanent contract increases.
Table 14 also shows that, as expected, the number of job interruptions negatively
affects future employment stability because the outflow fromunemployment decreases
and that the probabilities of being laid off or experiencing a job-to-job transition
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Table 13 Incidence of accumulated open-ended contract on employment and unemployment outflows
Employment exit probability Unemployment exit probability
Layoff (%) Quit (%) JJ–PC (%) JJ–TC (%) TC (%) PC (%)
Current/previous contract: TC
1 5.08 1.22 1.79 2.43 17.37 0.09
2 4.94 1.19 2.04 2.23 17.09 0.12
3 4.81 1.16 2.31 2.05 16.82 0.16
4 4.68 1.14 2.63 1.89 16.55 0.20
5 4.55 1.11 2.99 1.73 16.28 0.26
6 4.43 1.09 3.39 1.59 16.02 0.33
Current/previous contract: PC
1 0.32 0.22 0.54 0.28 8.44 0.46
2 0.31 0.21 0.62 0.25 8.33 0.61
3 0.30 0.21 0.70 0.23 8.21 0.80
4 0.29 0.20 0.80 0.21 8.10 1.06
5 0.29 0.20 0.91 0.19 7.98 1.41
6 0.28 0.19 1.04 0.18 7.87 1.86
Exit probabilities measured at mean of sample characteristics
Table 14 Incidence of accumulated job interruptions on employment and unemployment outflows
Employment Unemployment
Layoff (%) Quit (%) JJ–PC (%) JJ–TC (%) TC (%) PC (%)
Current contract: TC
1 4.35 1.02 1.98 2.57 17.36 0.10
2 4.70 1.11 1.81 2.58 17.49 0.09
3 5.09 1.20 1.66 2.59 17.54 0.07
4 5.55 1.30 1.51 2.60 17.65 0.07
5 5.95 1.41 1.38 2.62 17.76 0.07
6 6.43 1.52 1.26 2.63 17.87 0.06
Current contract: PC
1 0.30 0.20 0.56 0.28 10.69 0.07
2 0.33 0.22 0.51 0.28 10.76 0.06
3 0.36 0.24 0.46 0.28 10.83 0.06
4 0.39 0.26 0.42 0.28 10.90 0.06
5 0.42 0.28 0.39 0.28 10.97 0.05
6 0.46 0.31 0.35 0.28 11.04 0.04
Exit probabilities measure at mean of sample characteristics
to a new temporary contract increase considerably. The largest effect is found for
layoffs. For example, the monthly layoff probability increases from 4.35 % for one
job interruption to 6.43 % for six job interruptions.
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Note that the number of job interruptions seems to be a relatively important deter-
minant of employment stability compared to the results found for some of the UIS
parameter estimates. In our estimation, entitlement to and duration of benefits affect
the probability of having a job interruption, and the number of job interruptions affects
subsequent employment stability. Hence, to understand the dynamic effects of enti-
tlement duration on employment stability, the number of job interruptions and open-
ended contracts should be taken into account.
5 An illustration of the results through simulations
The analysis presented in Sect. 6 does not result in a complete understanding of the
overall effect of UIS entitlement duration on labour market stability. The medium-
and long-term effects of the UIS system can differ from the short-term impact when
employment duration depends on previous labour market history. Moreover, we have
shown that previous labour market history seems to be even more relevant to explain
current employment stability than the UIS. To gain insight into the dynamics of these
effects and to get information aboutwhich of the different alternative effects of benefits
on employment stability are dominant, we propose using some simulation exercises.
Because the reliability of these simulations depends on the capacity of our event
history model to predict the realised labour market transitions, we previously prepared
a report of goodness-of-fit checks of the estimated model. The description of the
simulation performed for the goodness-of-fit analysis and the results are included in
Appendix B. The primary conclusion from the goodness-of-fit analysis is that our
empirical model is well able to reproduce sample transitions and average employment
and unemployment spell durations.
5.1 Simulations of policy interventions
We propose here an exercise comprising an analysis of the effect of reducing, and
alternatively, increasing, UIS entitlement length duration relative to the current status
quo in Spain. Our main goal is to illustrate the previously described effects of the
UIS on employment and unemployment duration as well as on other elements that
influence employment stability. We are aware that our reduced-form duration model
cannot offer an answer in terms of causal evaluation, but still we think it is interesting
to perform the model to gain a deeper insight into the different results presented thus
far. To summarise, we have found that previous job interruptions negatively affect
job stability, and this effect increases with unemployment duration for non-recipients
of benefits. On the contrary, UIS recipients might have lengthier employment spells
than non-recipients, but this effect depends on previous unemployment duration and
benefit entitlement length. In addition, becoming eligible for benefits may increase
the outflows from employment. These results do not offer a clear answer in terms of
the capacity of the UIS to encourage stable labour market paths. For that purpose,
we simulate the estimated model for alternative UIS regimes. Specifically, apart from
solving for the current design of the UIS system in Spain (Status Quo), we simulate
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the following policies: (1) a 50 % decrease in benefit entitlement duration33; (2) a
50 % increase in entitlement duration; and (3) an increase in PC offers modelled as a
20 % decrease in the difference between the transitions (both from employment and
unemployment) to a permanent contract and the ones to a temporary contract.34
The relevance of this last simulation exercise is revealed in Table 2 and Fig. 2.
As illustrated in Table 2 the difference between the transition probabilities into a
permanent contract versus a temporary one is very large not only from employment
(11.4 % to a PC vs. 20.3 % to a TC) but mainly from unemployment (1.8 % to a
PC vs. 91.4 % to a TC). In this exercise we reduce these differences by 20 % in
order to evaluate whether employment stability could change for reasons other than
variations in the UIS and whether the gains in employment stability could be larger or
smaller than the gains achieved with the previous change in the UI entitlement. From
Krebs and Scheffel (2013), Krause and Uhlig (2012) or Launov andWälde (2013) one
can learn that it might be better to introduce reforms addressed to foster the labour
demand and to improve the quality and quantity of active labour market policies as
means to reduce job turnover and mean unemployment duration. With this simulation
we are trying to illustrate this idea. Hence, the main goal is to confront a change in
unemployment benefits with the potential effects of moving from a dual to a more
stable labour market, that is, one where permanent contracts are more likely, as it is
the case in the majority of OECD countries.
The simulation process is similar to the one performed for the goodness-of-fit
exercise described in Appendix B. In particular, we can construct individual labour
market histories for the alternativeUIS designs described above,which are then used to
predict the effects of policy changes on two main parameters: job turnover and overall
employment and unemployment duration. This simulation is executed for certain types
of individuals defined by specific observed characteristics. In particular, we divide the
sample by age (<30-, 30–45-, and>45-years-old), qualification at first job spell (low-
and high-skill) and type of contract held in the first job. In all cases, we assume
the individual is a full-time worker in the private sector. The variables related to the
UIS system that control for labour market paths (i.e., number of job interruptions,
number of permanent contracts, etc.) and time-varying individual variables, such as
labour market experience, are endogenously determined within the simulation., The
rest of the individual (exogenous) observed characteristics are computed at the sample
averages specific to each group and remain constant throughout the simulation,with the
exception of the worker’s age. Each worker’s labour market history is simulated 1,000
33 For example, an entitlement 6 months in the status quo would decrease to 3 months with the proposed
reform. The same rule applies to any other entitlement duration.
34 That is, for each individual, we compute the transition probability from employment/unemployment
to each type of contract in the status quo. Then, we compute the difference between these two transition
probabilities, at the individual level. This simulation comprises a drop in this gap of 20 %. This implies
a drop in the probability of transitioning to a temporary contract and an increase in the probability of
transitioning to a permanent contract, keeping constant the rest of transitions in the model. Hence, we are
only varying the weight of exits to permanent contracts relative to temporary contracts in order to simulate
an alternative framework where permanent employment is more likely.
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times during a 60-month period. The present simulation exercise therefore accounts
for medium-term effects.35
Based on our simulations, we compute the average number of unemployment and
employment episodes, mean employment and unemployment duration, the share of
workers that obtain a permanent contract and the total months of time employed during
the sample frame (60months). Interestingly,we can also use this simulation to compute
the financial balance of the benefit system at the individual level (UIS individual
balance). To do this, we use the rules of the Spanish Social Security system. That is,
the revenue of the system comes from workers’ benefit contributions, which represent
8.3 % of their monthly wages. The costs of the system depend on the length of time the
individual is unemployed, if any. Specifically, when she is unemployed, she receives
70 % of her previous wages during the first 6 months and 60 % of previous wages
from the 7th month onward, with a maximum duration of 24 months. The results are
presented in Table 15. For the sake of brevity, we only present results for low-skilled
workers who start in the labour market with a temporary contract because they are
the workers who suffer the largest degrees of job turnover and therefore are affected
to the greatest extent by the UIS system design.36 Furthermore, model estimates are
relevant for temporary workers whereas for permanent contract workers coefficients
are not always statistically significant. The results are presented in terms of the sample
means and percentiles 25 and 75 for each outcome variable.
A central conclusion from our simulation exercises is that when UIS entitlement
duration drops, the overall time spent employed increases, but labour market turnover
also coincidentally increases. Notably, the results on overall time spent employed are
driven primarily by the drop in unemployment duration caused by shorter UIS bene-
fit periods. For example, when the entitlement duration drops by 50 %, overall time
spent employed increases by 0.67, 2.33 and 2.58 % for young, middle-age and older
workers, respectively. Mean unemployment duration drops by approximately 5, 37
and 42 %, respectively, and mean employment duration decreases by approximately
0.57, 3 and 6 %, respectively. Thus, in this context, job turnover also increases. The
number of unemployment spells increases by 1.4, 3.2 and 2.5 % for the respective
age groups, whereas the number of job spells increases by 1.6, 4.6 and 3.5 %, respec-
tively. Interestingly, when we dig deeper and look at the 25th and 75th percentiles,
we observe that this gain in employment stability occurs primarily for low-stability
workers. For these workers (those located below the 25th percentile), employment
stability increases by 2.86, 4.76 and 6.82 % for the respective age groups. Again, this
increase in employment stability is driven primarily by a decrease in unemployment
duration.
When we look at the alternative policy regime, in which the duration of benefits
doubles, the results are basically similar although, of course, with opposite sign. Note
that the decrease in benefit duration does not translate into significant gains in stability
(the percentage of workers ending the simulated 60 months with a permanent contract
35 We also perform the simulation for a 10-year period. Given that the results do not change qualitatively,
we have opted to omit these data, although they are available upon request.
36 The results for the rest of the workers are quite similar to the ones shown here, although they are much
lower in absolute value.
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Table 15 Main simulation results: effect of changing the UIS entitlement length (sub-sample: those begin-



















No. of employment spells 5.55 5.62 5.49 4.06 3 3 3 2
No. of unemployment spells 2.89 2.94 2.88 1.88 1 1 1 1
Mean employment duration 11.54 11.48 11.52 15.60 5.11 5.11 5.13 8.33
Mean unemployment duration 5.80 5.51 6.13 6.18 2.5 2.33 2.80 2
Total months employed 44.79 45.09 44.32 48.93 35 36 35 36
% Workers ending into a PC 47.57 47.72 46.92 79.64 – – – –
UI individual balance 1.47 1.99 1.18 2.47 −0.38 0.59 −0.87 1.06
Aged 30–45
No. of employment spells 5.58 5.76 5.44 3.83 3 3 3 2
No. of unemployment spells 2.88 3.01 2.81 1.71 1 1 1 1
Mean employment duration 12.87 12.83 12.84 17.50 6.11 6.11 6.0 10.0
Mean unemployment duration 4.84 3.92 5.47 5.41 2.33 2.0 2.66 2.0
Total months employed 48.36 49.49 47.39 51.80 42 44 40 47
% Workers ending into a PC 36.82 37.47 36.42 77.59 – – – –
UI individual balance 0.270 0.717 −0.0368 1.299 −1.96 −1.21 −2.43 −0.46
Aged >45
No. of employment spells 4.67 4.79 4.55 3.43 3 3 3 2
No. of unemployment spells 2.11 2.18 2.03 1.33 1 1 1 1
Mean employment duration 16.45 16.56 16.51 20.25 7.60 7.71 7.60 11.50
Mean unemployment duration 5.47 4.35 6.21 6.23 2.5 2.0 2.83 2.75
Total months employed 50.42 51.72 49.77 52.78 44 47 43 49
% Workers ending into a PC 34.27 35.57 34.27 71.29 – – – –








Increase in PC offers
Aged <30
No. of employment spells 7 7 7 5
No. of unemployment spells 4 4 4 3
Mean employment duration 15.0 14.75 15.0 20.0
Mean unemployment duration 7.2 7 7.75 8
Total months employed 57 57 57 58
% Workers ending into a PC −− −− −− –
UI individual balance 4.56 4.56 4.56 4.81
Aged 30–45
No. of employment spells 7 7 7 5
No. of unemployment spells 4 4 4 2
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Increase in PC offers
Mean employment duration 17.0 16.67 16.67 24.0
Mean unemployment duration 6.0 5.0 7.0 7.0
Total months employed 57 57 57 59
% Workers ending into a PC – – – –
UI individual balance 3.41 3.41 3.33 4.19
Aged >45
No. of employment spells 6 6 6 4
No. of unemployment spells 3 3 3 2
Mean employment duration 20.00 20.00 20.00 28.00
Mean unemployment duration 7 5.4 8 8.33
Total months employed 59 59 59 60
% Workers ending into a PC – – – –
UI individual balance 4.81 4.81 4.81 4.98
is only slightly larger) but, as would be expected, the gains in terms of UIS individual
balance are much more important (when UI entitlements drop by 50 %, the individual
balance of the system grows by 35.4 %).
In any case, neither of the two alternative benefit regimes seems to cause a significant
variation in employment stability. However, the results are significantly different for
the final simulation, in which the gap between the probability of exiting to a permanent
contract and the probability of exiting to a temporary contract, from either employment
or unemployment, is decreased by 20 %. The large increase in employment stability
and the decrease in job turnover induced by the increase in the probability of entering
into a permanent contract are both notable. In this case, job stability increases by
10 % for young and middle-age workers and by 7 % for older workers. This increase
in job stability is primarily related to lengthier employment spells and, to a lesser
extent, to shorter unemployment episodes. In particular, mean employment duration
increases by 35, 36 and 23% for young, middle-age and older workers, respectively. It
is also notable that the growth in the share of workers that obtain permanent contracts
increases from 47 to 79 %, from 36 to 77 % and from 34 to 71 %, respectively, for
each age group.
6 Summary and conclusions
Changes in the UIS design happen quite frequently in a response to changing eco-
nomic conditions or based on dissatisfaction with the previous design. However, the
extent to which workers’ careers might improve or deteriorate as a result of changes
in the unemployment insurance design is not immediately clear. One might want to
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understand the impact of observed changes to the unemployment insurance system
on workers’ careers over time. In this paper, we have attempted to go a step further
than previous empirical analyses and offer an assessment of the overall influence of
UIS entitlement duration on employment stability, simultaneously accounting for the
competing effects of benefits on the duration of both unemployment and employ-
ment and also considering the occurrence of state dependence. In addition, we take
advantage of the Spanish labour market because it allows an assessment of whether
the effects of benefit entitlement differ between stable and unstable labour market
workers.
We find evidence of a positive effect of benefits on subsequent job duration, espe-
cially for temporary workers, through two main channels. First, insured workers have
lengthier subsequent job spells than uninsured workers, and this effect becomes more
significant as the length of the entitlement period increases. Second, previously insured
workers holding temporary contracts might experience greater probabilities of transi-
tion to permanent contracts than uninsured workers. Hence, previously insured work-
ers might benefit from better employment prospects than uninsured workers, either by
remaining in the same job or moving directly to a new permanent job. We illustrate
our results by simulating the processes of finding and losing work, starting with an
initial spell of employment and spanning the sample frame for each individual in the
data. These simulations are used to predict the effects of policy changes on the group
of workers in our sample. The main conclusion drawn from this simulation exercise is
that a reduction in the duration of unemployment benefits seems to have little effect on
time spent employed, whereas it increases job turnover rates. On the contrary, when
we simulate an increase in the entrance probability to a permanent contract, positive
and long-lasting effects are found in terms of job stability. In this last case, job sta-
bility increases by 10 % for young and middle-age workers and by 7 % for older
workers.
These results may be important from a policy perspective. It is interesting to attempt
to analyse the trade-offs in terms of social welfare between the costs of having shorter
employment spells or a more generous UI benefit system (a discussion re-examined in
Marimon and Zilibotti 1999). In particular, for a segmented labour market such as the
one in Spain, it is interesting to account for the ability of the UIS to foster or limit the
negative effect of job turnover, which opens up new perspectives on the UIS system.
Furthermore, given the current debate about the optimal design of unemployment ben-
efits over the business cycle (see, for example, Schmieder et al. 2012; Landais 2013 or
Hagedorn et al. 2013), it could be very interesting to analyse whether unemployment
benefits in Spain should increase or decrease during bad times. Note that as Chetty
(2008), we have found evidence that not only moral hazard effects but also liquidity
constraints could explain the strong correlation between benefit entitlement and unem-
ployment duration. However, to account for the effects put forward in Schmieder et
al. (2012), Landais (2013) or Hagedorn et al. (2013) the present reduced-form model
should be properly modified in order to separately identify the effects of such ben-
efits on workers behaviour and the ones on firms’ decision about vacancies. Hence,
it would be only with data on firms’ decisions that the micro and macro effects of
unemployment benefits could be properly analysed. This is part of our future research
agenda.
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Appendix A: Table of results
See Tables 16, 17, and 18.
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Table 16 Estimation results for the employment state (other covariates)
Competing risks Layoff Quit JJ–PC JJ–TC
Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat
Individual characteristics
Age −0.1609 −34.52 −0.5524 −42.4 −0.1416 −15.86 −0.1139 −17.25
Inmigrant 0.0460 4.91 0.5127 28.24 −0.0104 −0.66 0.4129 26.71
Seniority −0.0742 −42.68 −0.0797 −21.29 0.0593 14.71 0.0355 12.47
First job spell −0.6613 −28.86 −0.1799 −4.32 0.4914 9.42 0.1500 4.59
Job characteristics
Part−time 0.2148 23.25 0.5400 33.24 0.0274 1.39 0.3883 30.74
High skill job −0.3589 −36.25 −0.5096 −26.75 0.1193 7.95 −0.4590 −31.97
Construction −0.2464 −23.43 −0.2887 −16.46 −0.8524 −43.33 −0.0953 −1.21
Industry −0.1612 −18.21 −0.5253 −25.32 −0.3126 −20.99 −0.3666 −21.2
Small firm (<20) 0.044 7.59 0.1243 9.08 0.1032 6.7 0.1406 11.8
Public firm 0.1491 12.35 −1.3662 −26.22 −0.9641 −28.67 −0.3920 −14.01
Temporary help agency 0.6657 54.87 0.0914 2.04 1.0772 37.71 1.2036 62.89
PC −2.3654 −59.85 −1.3432 −27.58 −1.2256 −22.9 −2.9181 −49.82
Aggregate variables
Regional unemployment rate 0.0374 5.31 −0.3891 −25.76 −0.2917 −23.11 −0.0377 −4.74
National GDP growth rate −0.0542 −3.6 0.0177 0.6 0.3163 12.29 0.1088 5.41
Duration dependence (logs)
Duration*TC −0.3476 −15.11 0.3987 6.44 0.4333 3.93 −0.4107 −14.14
Duration2*TC 0.1798 10.27 −0.5332 −6.07 −0.4661 −4.31 0.2206 11.87
Duration3*TC −0.0532 −16.16 0.1839 4.51 0.2464 6.39 −0.0508 −14.94
Duration4*TC − − −0.0251 −4.47 −0.0323 −8.66 – –
Duration*PC −1.2724 −14.47 −0.7776 −9.17 −0.9544 −10.67 0.7027 15.53
Duration2*PC 0.8092 22.29 0.5443 11.4 0.7500 17.7 −0.2073 −23.04
Duration3*PC −0.1379 −26.49 −0.1069 −14.54 −0.1371 −23.13 – –
(Duration = 3)*TC 0.3983 35.98 – – 0.3515 12.12 0.1930 14.94
(Duration = 6)*TC 0.9377 77.42 – – 1.2261 50.2 0.8674 63.61
(Duration = 9)*TC 0.4651 22.08 – – 0.4614 12.57 0.3633 17.56
(Duration = 12)*TC 1.3415 73.04 – – 1.6721 61.36 1.4198 74.75
(Duration = 24)*TC 0.9907 23.55 – – 1.4484 33.33 0.9692 10.11
(Duration = 36)*TC 0.8272 10.65 – – 0.8454 10.81 0.9013 11.72
(Duration = 6)*PC 0.3306 6.47 – – 0.3817 2.71 −0.1575 −2.85
(Duration = 12)*PC 0.3721 6.65 – – 0.0834 2.32 – –
(Duration = 24)*PC 0.2789 4.31 – – 0.2844 3.42 – –
Previous state characteristics
Job-to-job −0.4843 −45.800 −0.2631 −11.38 0.0565 3.34 0.0428 3.8
Unemployed due to a quit −0.1746 −13.010 0.2752 14.36 0.1150 5.98 0.0184 1.50
Received assistant benefits 0.1246 6.13 −0.3536 −4.89 −0.0003 0.56 −0.0238 −0.82
Constant −2.0630 −104.4 −2.0525 −51.56 −3.8664 −100.23 −3.3741 −114.4
TC temporary contract, PC permanent contract
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Table 17 Estimation results for the unemployment state (other covariates)
Competing risks TC PC
Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat
Individual characteristics
Age −0.0840 −16.91 −0.0549 −1.76
Inmigrant 0.4152 31.1 −0.1015 −1.47
Seniority 0.2567 61.56 0.4934 20.73
Job characteristics
Part−time −0.1583 −15.41 0.1051 2.19
High skill job −0.0170 −2.18 0.2785 6.18
Construction 0.1413 14.65 −0.6891 −9.71
Industry 0.0387 5.38 0.0793 1.45
Small firm (<20) −0.0061 −0.35 −0.0600 −1.49
Public firm −0.2081 −12.85 −0.5460 −6.29
Temporary help agency 0.2142 16.32 −0.0248 −0.25
PC −0.0168 −1.03 0.1173 1.27
Aggregate variables
Regional unemployment rate −0.0211 −3.78 −0.1264 −3.15
National GDP growth rate 0.0981 6.56 0.3785 2.10
Duration dependence (logs)
log(duration)*TC −0.7105 −15.62 −0.8284 −12.07
log(duration)2*TC 0.6795 8.3 0.2453 10.27
log(duration)3*TC −0.4031 −9.75 – –
log(duration)4*TC 0.0772 12.32 – –
log(duration)*PC −0.8551 −7.24 −0.2884 −2.26
log(duration)2*PC 0.8324 3.98 0.0426 0.97
log(duration)3*PC −0.4923 −4.85 – –
log(duration)4*PC 0.0906 6.08 – –
(Duration=6)*TC 0.0414 1.73 – –
(Duration=12)*TC 0.5513 26.99 – –
(Duration=12)*PC 0.0727 1.27 – –
UIS variables
Receives assistant benefits −0.8316 −39.72 −1.2888 −9.53
Unemployed due to a quit −0.0948 −10.51 0.0384 −0.47
Constant −1.7278 −62.44 −6.8789 −43.6
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Table 18 Estimation results for the individual heterogeneity distribution
Individual heterogeneity distribution (M = 3)
Coef Z-stat Coef Z-stat
Points of support Type I Type II
Employment
Layoff −0.8954 −62.12 −0.9944 −47.63
Quit −1.1249 −40.77 −1.248 −39.9
JJ–PC −0.7852 −27.91 −1.1298 −40.98
JJ–TC −0.6599 −26.2 −1.569 −71.18
Unemployment
TC 0.6342 32.97 −0.1945 −8.42
PC 2.5694 19.47 0.5564 3.7
Probability masses (logistic transformation) 0.5787 12.45 1.006 21.43
Resulting probabilities 32.31 % 49.56 %
Appendix B: Goodness of fit
To check how well the model fits the main characteristics of the data, no simple test
is available. Rather, employment histories have to be simulated and then compared
to the original data. For that purpose, our full sample is divided into two subsamples,
one used for estimation purposes the other used for simulation purposes. That is, for
a given sample of individuals (50 % of the individuals), we conduct the simulations
dynamically from the beginning of their first spell in the sample until the end of their
fifth year in the labour force. Thus, we simulate their first sixty months in their labour
market career. The steps followed in the simulation are now described.
For these simulations, the exogenous variables are taken from the observed data
(i.e. the characteristics of the first spell are given by the original data), whereas the
endogenous ones are constructed by using the parameters estimated using the other
50 % of the individuals in the sample. In the first spell, we randomly assign each
individual in the sample a value of the individual unobserved heterogeneity coefficient
(i.e. we determine of which type the individual is). This assignment of “individual
types” is driven by the estimated distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. The second
step is to assign to each individual their transition intensities and destination states.
Given the set of exogenous explanatory variables, the individual random effect and the
endogenous variables,we compute the hazard rates for each individual. The destination
states in the following period are determined by the estimated hazard rates and by an
exogenous shock. Whenever the hazard exceeds the exogenous shock, a transition
into another state takes place and we start evaluating the hazards out of the new state,
conditional on the individual’s labourmarket history. After a transition has taken place,
the record of the individual is updated to reflect changes in employment history and
in the UIS parameters. This process is repeated until each worker is simulated over
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Fig. 6 Goodness of fit for the Employment Hazard Notice that temporary contracts with duration lengthier
than 36months are not commongiven the regulation of temporary contracts in Spain. Those cases correspond
with workers who remained in the same firm with different temporary contracts but had job interruptions
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Fig. 7 Goodness of fit for the unemployment hazard
the periods which are observed. The resulting data set is a random history, which is
compatible with the exogenous and endogenous variables.
The simulation results we present are averaged over the distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity. The result of this exercise is then compared to the raw data used to
123
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Table 19 Goodness of fit










Time spent employed 43.08 38.01
execute the simulation. Figures 6 and 7 compare empirical hazard rates to simulated
hazard rates and Table 19 presents main summary statistics for both the simulated data
and the raw data. These statistics are mean employment and unemployment duration
as well as time spent employed during the simulated period. As can be seen from these
figures and table the model fits the data relatively well.
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